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Abstract 
The effect of globalisation on international financial services regulatory 
compliance includes multi-national enterprises (MNEs) having to address 
a proliferation of jurisdictional controls including governance risk 
management, securities and insurance, anti-money laundering, and anti-
bribery and corruption. Establishing financial services regulatory controls 
that are effective across jurisdictions in this environment requires both 
high level policies and diverse jurisdictional controls that can be 
monitored in detail to provide an audit trail for investigative regulatory 
scrutiny, and help protect the MNE from prosecution.  In a swiftly, ever-
changing regulatory landscape, compliance activities have to be agile to 
achieve this, of course with restricted resourcing.  This work discusses 
how a governance culture that embraces soft law conventions as well as 
hard law requirements in a financial services MNE can be effective as a 
business enabling and risk minimising compliance programme. 
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Introduction 
This work primarily discusses the jurisdictional challenge of compliance with diverse 
financial services regulatory requirements for multi-national enterprises (MNEs),1 
with a focus on the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU).  It includes the 
relevance of international soft law conventions of international Standard Setting 
Bodies (SSBs) such as those of the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-
operation (OECD) and hard primary and secondary laws and regulations of individual 
jurisdictions, including those with extra-territorial reach.  It also includes the issues of 
transparency, responsibility, accountability, risk management and democratic aspects 
of effective corporate governance and globalisation when embedding effective 
controls in a MNE.  
 
The reactive nature of regulatory development, jurisdictional and sovereignty 
considerations together with technological and communications advancement impact 
the approach of financial services MNEs to establishing effective regulatory controls, 
especially as global financial markets are becoming more independent of geography.2  
MNEs have the choice of centralised or decentralised corporate governance approach 
to running their businesses, and in local country requirements, either to be proactive, 
ensuring that all is in order before they start to do business in a jurisdiction, or re-
active and clear issues up as they arise in their local corporate entities, correcting 
                                                 
1 The term “multi-national” is used in this work rather than “transnational” as the application of laws in 
jurisdictions of subsidiary entities presents multiple, equally important requirements on financial 
services firms. 
2 House of Lords European Union Committee, 2nd Report of session 2012-2013, ‘MiFID II: Getting it 
Right for the City and EU Financial Services Industry,’ London: The Stationery Office Limited (July 
2012) 
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behaviour on regulatory request.  By example, today’s financial services regulatory 
landscape encourages the latter behaviour rather than the former.  However, the 
elements are there for a proactive approach to international regulation on a more 
cohesive basis, with the G20 for international regulatory standard setting, and Europe 
for cross-border regulation among sovereign states leading the way, especially with 
the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and regulatory 
reform in the UK towards a proactive approach.  This is by no means a new idea, as in 
his essay, “Perpetual Peace,” of 1795 Immanuel Kant: 
“…argued not for world government, but for a law-governed international 
society among sovereign states, in which the strong ties existing among 
individuals create mutual interests that cut across national 
lines…(creating) moral interdependence, and lead(ing) to greater 
possibilities for peace through international agreement.”3 
 
As financial services controls are aimed at the protection of consumers,4 financial 
stability and market integrity, efforts to achieve this by the international community 
acting together as a harmonising force in protecting the investors of all jurisdictions,  
including curbing pro-cyclical market movements,5 has attained greater urgency and 
focus since the 2007-2009 financial crisis (the financial crisis).  The activities of 
international SSBs will be discussed further in Chapter 1. 
 
Financial Services Regulators persist in trying to narrow the gap between industry 
practice and innovation, regulating the conduct of corporate entities to encourage risk 
minimization on a reactive basis, and there is a negative impact on controls when 
regulators are weak.  Frequently following a financial scandal, developments are 
                                                 
3 Koh, Harold Hongju, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 
2101 (1997) p 2610 
4 Whether they are retail securities investors or professional investors interested in sovereign bonds. 
5 Stiglitz, Joseph, Globalisation and its Discontents, New York: Norton (2003) p 100: Pro-cyclical 
capital flows are where, “…capital flows out of a country in a recession, precisely when the country 
needs it most, and flows in during a boom, exacerbating inflationary pressures.” 
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made to UK law and regulations that strengthen corporate governance controls, 
moving them a little further away from adherence to voluntary codes, and towards 
mandatory obedience of laws and regulation.  For example, in the UK the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was closed down by the Bank of England 
(BoE) in July 1991 after being found engaging in fraud, tax evasion, money 
laundering, arms trafficking, smuggling, unlawful property dealing, bribery and the 
support of terrorism.6  This scandal resulted in the review of the Securities and 
Investments Board by its Chairman, Andrew Large, who produced a report7 
recommending greater transparency in regulation and the implementation of the 
government’s plans on regulatory reform.8  The lack of effective embedding of these 
controls because of the reactive and political nature of regulatory development, as in 
the case of the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), negatively impacts on the 
credibility of a jurisdiction’s regulator.  Regulations devised to control industry 
behaviour can only be effective if the individuals carrying out supervision and 
enforcement activity are adequately skilled and knowledgeable, and can apply them 
consistently and intelligently.  Poor quality and delivery of enforcement results is 
more detrimental to a regulator’s credibility than empowering of it, and inconsistent 
enforcement does not empower financial services compliance leaders in the board 
room.  Effective financial services risk mitigation controls are also at the heart of 
good corporate governance for MNEs to better achieve sustainability by maintaining 
reputation and market share.  Corporate governance and risk management of MNEs 
are the subjects of Chapter 2. 
                                                 
6 Hoare, Steve, ‘Judge Surprised by Collapse of BCCI Trial,’ The Lawyer (3 November 2005)  
7 Large, Sir Andrew, ‘Report to the Chancellor on the Reform of the Financial Regulatory System,’ 
(The Large Report) London (July 1997) 
8 Walker, George A., International Banking: Law, Policy, and Practice, London: Kluwer Law 
International (2001) p 247 
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The three fold purposes of financial services regulation promote the interests of 
investors and protect those who save, it regulates securities distribution in the primary 
and secondary markets9, and it provides regulation to ensure the orderly functioning 
of the financial market.  Jurisdictions develop regulatory regimes overseeing 
individuals and entities for use in their own countries.  The rules country regulators 
make, their supervision of obedience to those rules, enforcement where they find non-
compliance, and litigation when the rules are broken are micro-prudential10 in nature.  
They are important in maintaining investor confidence in the market, but discount the 
macro-prudential11 risks that can build up in the financial system.  Technological and 
communications advances, in particular the internet have opened up financial markets, 
and with no internationally held responsibility for regulating financial services, soft 
law conventions serve to deter MNEs from engaging in regulatory arbitrage: 
capitalising on loopholes in financial regulation to circumvent unfavourable 
requirements. 
“Despite problems of authority, process, and legitimacy…soft law 
securities regulation is generally desirable internationally as it counteracts 
competitive races to the bottom, and makes regulatory cooperation more 
palatable.”12 
 
The fundamental legal requirements on this are most broadly promulgated by the 
World Trade Organisation and the Treaty of Rome.13  Prior to the financial crisis, 
                                                 
9 Primary market is the market of securities when first issued, when the capital raised goes to the 
issuing entity.  Secondary transactions are when the first owner sells securities on to others in the 
market.  
10 Micro-prudential regulation refers to the regulation of individuals and entities that does not take into 
consideration the interconnections across the financial system, or the impact they may have. 
11 Macro-prudential regulation refers to the interconnected financial system, and seeks to control the 
impact of financial services players on other entities and jurisdictions across the financial system. 
12 Kelly, Claire and Karmel, Roberta, ‘The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation,’ Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 141 (2009) 
13 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome 1957) 
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insufficient attention was given to the risks of globalisation, and as the cost to EU 
Member States of bailing out banks represented 13% of EU Gross Domestic Product 
in 200814 it is perhaps unsurprising that the EU is committed to minimising the impact 
of any future crisis by implementing the reforms led by the G20 via the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) and Basel 3.  Globalisation will be discussed further in Chapter 
3. 
 
This work seeks to establish that by using jurisdictional hard law it is not possible to 
embed effective regulatory controls in a financial services MNE that are coherent, 
manageable and which offer a robust foundation on which to build effective corporate 
governance without embracing international soft law conventions.  This research has 
been based on primary sources of information.  However, secondary sources of 
information have also been referenced where necessary, including works by 
Alexander, Ferran, Senden and Stiglitz for international SSBs and globalisation, and 
Cadbury, Norton and Walker on corporate governance. 
                                                 
14 Barnier, Michel, ‘Towards More Responsibility and Competitiveness in the European Financial 
Sector,’ Brussels: Internal Market and Services, European Commission (2010) p 11 
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Chapter 1  
International Standard Setting Bodies: Their Contribution to Establishing 
Effective Regulatory Control Systems 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis has given new focus to macro-prudential systemic market matters, 
and soft law conventions are having real impact on the establishment of effective 
regulatory controls.  The impact of regulatory controls suggested by international SSB 
conventions may be considered as impaired by them being non-enforceable and 
therefore prone to being overlooked.  However, it would be an error to assume that 
because of this they are not important influencers of MNEs and governments, and as a 
development of EU law: 
“…soft law instruments have acquired a particular meaning, significance 
and legal status.”15 
 
1.2 The Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis, which caused the “virtual collapse” of the financial system16 in 
the UK and Europe, has raised questions on the activities of international SSBs and 
financial regulation on a global scale.  The G20, and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, formed by the G10 in 1974,17 are important initiators of change in 
international financial services regulation, whose recommendations are evidenced in 
                                                 
15 Senden, Linda, Soft Law in European Community Law, Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing (2004) p 
110 
16 Gadbaw, Michael, ‘Systemic regulation of global trade and finance: a tale of two systems,’ Journal 
of International Economic Law (2010) p 551 
17Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘History of the Basel Committee and its Membership,’ 
Basel: Bank for International Settlements (August 2009) 
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the newly reinforced EU financial architecture. Leading up to the financial crisis 
micro-prudential, disclosure based, instruments of financial services regulation were 
largely ineffective as no systemic risk mitigation system was incorporated into the 
regulatory paradigm, presenting local regulators with the challenge of trying to use 
micro-prudential regulatory controls to manage macro-prudential issues in the broader 
financial system.18  Above all, it has been identified that: 
“…the recent financial crisis has demonstrated the importance of 
having a robust macro-prudential supervisory framework and micro-
prudential supervisory regime with the objective of controlling 
systemic risk.”19 
 
As the impact of the financial crisis became evident, Jaques de Larosiere, Chair of the 
High-Level Expert Group on EU Financial Supervision, delivered a report20 to the 
European Commission, with the aim of promoting: 
“…much stronger, coordinated supervision for all financial actors in the 
European Union. With equivalent standards for all, thereby preserving fair 
competition throughout the internal market…to build confidence among 
supervisors. And real trust. With agreed methods and criteria. So all 
Member States can feel that their investors, their depositors, their citizens 
are properly protected in the European Union.” 21 
 
Stronger, more coordinated supervision was delivered in the EU on January 1st 2011, 
when three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): the European Banking 
Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority became operational, replacing the Level 3 
Lamfalussy committees,22 which had no power over local country regulators.23  The 
                                                 
18 Alexander, Kern, et al, Global Governance of Financial Systems: The International Regulation of 
Systemic Risk, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006) 
19 Alexander, Kern, ‘Reforming European financial supervision and the role of EU institutions,’ Amicus 
Curiae, Issue 82 (2010) p 2 
20 EU High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, ‘The De Larosiere Report,’ Brussels 
(2009) 
21Alexander, op cit. at 19, p 5 
22Committee of Wise Men, ‘Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets,’ Brussels (2001) p 37 
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ESAs have powers to draft technical standards, investigate national competent 
authorities, take action against them where allowed by treaty, and in emergency 
situations that threaten financial stability they can also ban regulated activities or 
products.  These authorities now interpret international conventions for the EU and 
require Member State regulators to implement them into national law.  Their aim is 
not to replace national regulators, but to co-ordinate them better, and provide 
arbitration where necessary.24  Their powers represent significant reform to the 
supervision of European MNEs.  To support them, the ESRB was also established at 
the same time.  The ESRB is designed to operate without any legally binding powers, 
and yet it occupies a pivotal position in the reinforced EU financial supervisory 
architecture to provide a better oversight of systemic risks.25  However, its 
effectiveness has yet to be seen, and it is questionable as to whether it can be 
effective, given that it is operating in areas in which earlier attempts by SSBs failed.26  
Attempts to strengthen financial services regulatory architecture help to establish 
more robust control frameworks within MNEs, and the flexibility that 
recommendations and guidelines offer when responding quickly to the need for 
effective regulatory development,27 (albeit that this is not always the case)28 is well 
established in the EU’s high level principles and risk-based processes structure of 
                                                                                                                                            
23 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS); the Committee of European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS); and the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) 
24 Barnier, Michel, ‘The date of 1st January 2011 marks a turning point for the European Financial 
Sector,’ Brussels: Speech at European Commission, (January 2011) 
25 Ferran, Eilis, and Kern Alexander, ‘Can soft law bodies be effective?  The special case of the 
European Systemic Risk Board,’ European Law Review (2010) p 751 
26 Ibid. p 758 
27Boyle, Alan, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’ 48 I.C.L.Q. (1999) pp 
901-903 
28 McCreevy, Charlie, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Keynote Address at 
‘Financial Reporting in a Changing World,’ Conference, Brussels (May 2009) 
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financial services supervision.29  The influence of G20 and EU regulations in the UK 
is much stronger now that the ESAs and ESRB are in place, and this comprehensive 
legislative framework provides EU country regulators common and effective ways of 
tackling future bank crises.30 To implement reform well in the UK, supervision from 
the BoE in balancing micro and macro-prudential regulation, defining responsibilities 
and managing the transition to the new regulatory structure will be key.  The move to 
establish the ESAs and the ESRB demonstrates that Europe is upholding its 
international commitments and is working with other authorities across the world, 
which appears to be a major step forward in better global supervision of MNEs.31 
 
1.3 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive32 (MiFID) was introduced as a 
harmonising directive in November 2007.  It amended, and in some Member States, 
increased regulatory expectations.  Following this, MiFID II33 aims to introduce a 
binding pan-European rulebook with the intention of ensuring consistent application 
across all Member States, as, 
“The need to adapt regulation to serve a more complex market reality 
characterised by increasing diversity in financial instruments and 
methods of trading is reflected in all major recent EU reforms in the 
financial services area.”34 
 
Importantly, the MiFID II proposal states that in an emergency situation (without 
defining what an “emergency” situation may be) the ESAs can take direct control of 
                                                 
29 Financial Services Authority, ‘Principles-based Regulation: Focusing on the outcomes that matter,’ 
London (2007) 
30 Trichet, Jean-Claude,‘The Future of Risk Management and Regulation: Smarter regulation, safer 
markets,’ Frankfurt: Speech at European Central Bank Frankfurt Main Finance Summit (23 March 2011) 
31 Barnier, op. cit. at 14,  p 64  
32 Directive 2004/39/EC 
33 Amendments to MiFID in consultation and review. 
34 European Commission, Directorate General Internal Market and Services, ‘Public Consultation, 
Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID),’ Brussels (December 2010) 
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national regulation of EU Member States.  In view of the novelty of the ESAs, it can 
be expected that the individuals charged with the above responsibilities will need time 
to develop them in terms of policy and approach, and unless an event deemed to be an 
emergency occurs to accelerate it, their establishment may be slow.  These EU 
initiatives effectively strengthen regulatory controls, encouraging the enactment into 
local country law elements of the agreement at the G20 Seoul Summit in 2010, which 
advocates taking action: 
“… at the national and international level to raise standards, and ensure that 
our national authorities implement global standards developed to date, 
consistently, in a way that ensures a level playing field, a race to the top and 
avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism and regulatory arbitrage. In 
particular, we will implement fully the new bank capital and liquidity 
standards and address too-big-to-fail problems.”35  
 
 
1.4 SSBs: Gaps and Overlaps 
Other SSBs, such as the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), use their influence to create un-enforceable multi-jurisdictional standards. 
This has: 
“…a hard impact in a number of areas, including prudential banking 
regulation…because…(they have) been adopted and implemented into the 
domestic legal and regulatory regimes of most countries with functioning 
financial markets.”36 
 
Historically, SSBs have independently established their regulatory parameters, and 
IOSCO identifies several areas of law that make up the legal framework of securities 
regulation, within which the instruments of financial regulation reside.37  These 
include disclosure, company law, contract law, banking law, taxation law, bankruptcy 
                                                 
35 G20 Seoul Summit 2010, ‘The Seoul Summit Document,’ Seoul (November 2010) p 22 
36 Alexander, Kern, ‘Rebuilding international financial regulation,’ Journal of International Banking & 
Financial Law, Volume 26/Issue 8 (September 2011) p 489 
37 International Organisation of Securities Commissions, ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation,’ (2003) p 68 
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law and the law of dispute resolution, which also embraces enforcement of court 
orders and arbitration awards.   However, IOSCO is just one of the SSBs,38 and by 
virtue of operating individually their work can overlap with other SSBs, or leave gaps 
in regulation,39 which does not help MNEs to establish effective regulatory controls.   
 
1.5 Co-ordinating the Efforts of International SSBs 
To help remedy this, the G20 summit held at Cannes in November 2011 addressed 
several areas of law and regulations,40 including the means of enhancing supervision 
of the implementation of their decisions at national level, the oversight of 
systemically important financial institutions, crisis resolution regimes and the shadow 
banking sector.41 
“The G20 leaders asked the FSB to work in collaboration with the OECD 
and other international organisations to explore…options for advancing 
financial consumer protection through informed choices that include 
disclosure; transparency and education; protection from fraud, abuse and 
errors; along with recourse and advocacy.”42 
 
However, cross border regulation is still a major impediment to implementing 
effective regulatory controls in MNEs, acknowledged by the FSB: 
“Internationally, impediments to cross-border resolution derive from 
major differences in national resolution regimes, absence of mutual 
recognition and agreements for joining up home and host regimes, and 
lack of planning for handling stress and resolution.”43 
 
Steps to minimise the effect of this were made at the G20 Cannes Summit when 
members agreed to strengthen the FSB’s capacity, resources and governance.   Also in 
                                                 
38 The standard setting bodies include national regulators as well as international standard setting 
bodies. 
39 Turner, Lord Adair, ‘Macro-prudential policy in deflationary times,’ Manchester: Speech during 
Financial Policy Committee Regional Visit (20 July 2012) 
40 Bremer, Katherine, ‘Key Outcomes of G20 Cannes Summit,’ New York: Reuters (4 November 2011) 
41 G20 Cannes Summit, ‘a snapshot of steps taken and progress made 2008 – 2011,’ Cannes (2011) 
42 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘G20 High Level Principles on 
Financial Consumer Protection,’ Paris (2011) p 3 
43 Financial Stability Board, ‘Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial 
institutions, FSB Recommendations and Time Lines,’ Basel (2010) p 3 
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2011, the FSB announced policy measures to address the systemic and moral hazard 
risks of global systemically important financial institutions, including a new 
international reference standard for national resolution regimes, detailing the 
responsibilities, instruments and powers they should have.44  As a result, a revised 
FSB charter was presented to the G20 Los Cabos Summit in June 2012, with the aim 
of FSB co-ordinating SSBs at an inter-governmental level, 
“In order to develop and promote the implementation of effective 
regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies…and help 
coordinate the alignment of the activities of the SSBs to address any 
overlaps or gaps and clarify demarcations in light of changes in national and 
regional regulatory structures.”45 
 
 
1.6 The Basel Accords 
In banking supervision, successive Basel Accords proposed improved capital 
adequacy requirements for banks.  Basel I46 was simplistic in its capital adequacy 
ratings.  Basel II47 was more developed but still looked only at the banking book, 
which contains longer term assets for capital adequacy.  Before the financial crisis, 
markets held the global financial optimism of Harry Markowitz, whose portfolio 
diversification theory allegedly results in lower capital risk and greater reliability of 
returns.48  MNE banks are essential players in financial services transactions, and 
they, their regulators and sovereigns held: 
                                                 
44 Financial Stability Board, ‘Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions,’ Basel (November 2011) section 4 i) 
45 Financial Stability Board, ‘Report to the G20 Los Cabos Summit on Strengthening FSB Capacity, 
Resources and Governance,’ Basel (June 2012) Appendix 1, Article 1, p 2 
46Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework,’ Basel: Bank for International Settlements (July 1988) 
47 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel II: International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework,’ Basel: Bank for International 
Settlements (November 2005) 
48 Markowitz, Harry, ‘The Rand Corporation,’ New York: Journal of Finance (1952) p 77 
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“…the erroneous belief that financial markets were inherently stable, and 
that the Basel II capital adequacy regime would itself ensure a sound 
banking system.”49 
 
This encouraged the MNEs to underplay risk, and was the basis for capital adequacy 
calculations for banks in Basel II, which does not provide for counter-cyclical capital 
requirements.50  Indeed, 
“Basel II embodied some of the major weaknesses with the current 
international financial standard setting approach… (which) 
disproportionately focused on the risk facing the individual firm, and not 
the risk facing the firm in a malfunctioning financial system…Essentially, 
Basel II embodied the failure of financial policymakers and regulators to 
incorporate systemic risks into the design of regulatory institutions and of 
risk management.”51 
 
The proposals in Basel III52 amount to a series of measures for banks to promote the 
build-up of capital buffers in good times that can be drawn upon in a down-turn, to 
ensure that banks are considerably more resilient, and robust enough so that a bank’s 
demise should not inflict social damage, backed up by a more intrusive regulatory 
approach.  Basel III covers liquidity, credit risk and mortgage risk, and the measures 
proposed increase the ratio of equity capital to risk weighted assets in banks from 2% 
to 7%, including the requirement that banks hold sufficient capital to endure a period 
of stress.  This figure is even higher when combined with the changes to the definition 
of equity, the increase in some risk weights and the changes to the numerator, ratio 
and denominator,53 yet it is still less than half that proposed as “ideal” by David Miles 
                                                 
49 Financial Services Authority, ‘The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland,’ London (December 2011) p 
11 
50 Alexander, Kern, ‘Summary Report, Central Bank Governors Meeting,’ Limassol Cyprus: 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting (2009) p 2 
51 Alexander, op. cit. at 36, p 493 
52 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems’ Basel: Bank for International Settlements (December 2010, 
revised June 2011) 
53 Turner, Lord Adair, ‘Leverage, Maturity Transformation and Financial Stability: Challenges 
beyond Basel III,’ London: Speech at Cass Business School (2011) 
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of the BoE Monetary Policy Committee.54  The impact on large and MNE banks of 
increased capital adequacy requirements are judged to be minimal,55 and without a 
negative social impact, but whether they are sufficient to minimise the impact of a 
future financial crisis is unlikely as they appear to be more of a transitional step than a 
goal.  And indeed, Basel III only strengthens: 
“…prudential regulation in limited ways…this fails to address the externality 
problem posed by financial institutions which requires a more holistic 
approach to regulation.”56 
 
1.7 Informational Intermediaries 
The change in regulation of informational intermediaries is an important step towards 
the establishment of effective regulatory controls, as under-pricing of financial risk 
can give rise to systemic failures once the market correction is realised.  For 
individual countries it may be seen as a disempowering move with a high sovereignty 
cost,57 but from a macro-prudential point of view, it is a cost effective way of better 
managing pricing risk to the benefit of financial stability, and for the effectiveness of 
controls in MNE banks.  This is because an element in financial risk is pricing, and 
the credit rating agencies contributed to the financial crisis by underestimating the risk 
that issuers of financial instruments may not repay their debts and changing ratings 
too slowly as market conditions worsened.58   
 
1.8 Clearing Houses 
                                                 
54 Miles, D., Yang, J. and Marcheggiano, G. ‘Optimal Bank Capital,’ External MPC Unit, Discussion 
Paper No 31 (2011) 
55 Anat Admati, Peter Demarzo, Martin Hellwig and Paul Pfleiderer, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts and 
Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation, Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive, Max Planck Society 
(2010) p 41 
56 Alexander, op. cit. at 36, p 494 
57 Danner, Allison M., and Beth Simmons, ‘Sovereignty Costs, Credible Commitments, and the 
International Criminal Court,’ Yale Law School: New Haven, Connecticut (2007) 
58 Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011  
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The regulatory push for banks to move derivative contracts to clearing houses is 
causing a new risk to MNEs, as the large banks themselves own the clearing houses 
with the aim of minimising both the cost of capital and the burden on their monitoring 
requirements.  This produces concentration risk, as if the clearing house fails so do all 
of the large banks that operate through it, and it is unlikely that any government 
would be able to produce sufficient funds to bail out a clearing house, heightening 
rather than minimising the impact of a future crisis on the depositors and taxpayers of 
the countries involved. Now that multi-national banking services are common, 
sensitivity to systemic risk is caused by their interconnected nature. 
 
1.9 Regulatory Harmonisation  
The financial crisis could prove to be an important catalyst in harmonising international 
financial services regulation for MNEs, offering them potentially improved regulatory 
controls.  However, enforceable hard law developments are unlikely to come from any 
inter-governmental institution, as international SSBs have not received the necessary 
support of their members to formalise guidelines at an inter-governmental level, rather: 
“…the focus has been on reforming the soft law system to make it more 
effective and more representative of those states subject to its standards. 
Despite the various imperfections and limitations of softer methods in 
international financial regulation, policymakers appear to have concluded 
that no better option is realistically available in the immediate future and 
that a soft law-based approach can meaningfully promote regulatory 
objectives.”59 
 
Another catalyst of regulatory harmonisation is cross-fertilisation of regulatory 
experience across major markets, such as Martin Wheatley returning to UK regulation 
after five years as Chief Executive Officer of Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures 
                                                 
59 Alexander, op. cit. at 36, p 491 
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Commission.60  In a speech to launch the Wheatley Review into failings of 
governance around Libor,61 he said, 
“It is only by utilising the expertise from across the financial sector and 
across the globe that we can effectively solve the problems before us for 
Libor.  My goal is to ensure that Libor is reformed in a way that ensures 
credibility and trust – both in our financial system and for consumers that 
rely on us.”62 
 
If the SSBs are to work more closely together, especially if some, such as the ESRB, 
have hard-edged soft powers,63 communications to create good understanding will be 
essential: 
“…so that they do indeed complement each other and do not become 
embroiled in debilitating turf wars.”64 
 
Also, improved communications and the potential improvement of trust via 
familiarity with other SSBs could result in the more consistent implementation 
of soft law conventions into local regulations. 
 
1.10 Politically Driven Reform 
Politics contribute to changes in regulatory architecture, as they did in the UK 
when the FSA was brought into being by the new Labour government, gaining 
its powers from the Financial Services and Markets Act 200065 (FSMA) and 
replacing nine financial services regulatory authorities66 to form a single 
                                                 
60 Financial Services Authority, Board Members List, July 2012 
61 The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is a daily reference rate based on the interest rates at 
which banks borrow unsecured funds 
62 Wheatley, Martin, ‘Wheatley Review – the Future of Libor,’ Speech by Martin Wheatley, Managing 
Director, FSA at Bloomberg, 10 August 2012 
63 Ferran and Alexander, op. cit. at 25 
64 Ibid.  p 773 
65 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 c. 8 
66 These include the Personal Investment Authority, the Investment Management Regulatory 
Organisation and the Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation 
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financial services regulator.  In the foreword to its launch document in October 
1997, Chairman Howard Davies was quite sure that the FSA would enhance 
consumer protection.67  It would do this by being a single micro-prudential 
regulator able to offer consistency across industry sectors, and prevent areas of 
financial services from dropping through the gaps between its predecessors. 
Writing after the financial crisis, one might wish to challenge whether this was 
successfully achieved, as areas of “underlap”68 were acknowledged in the Turner 
Review.69  However, the FSA: 
“…remains a sophisticated, expert organization that has been operating at 
the highest levels in an intensely demanding field.”70 
 
To ignore this in the current politically-driven reforms in the UK regulatory 
architecture would squander the past successes of the FSA, and may take financial 
services regulation through the instability of institutional reform only to establish an 
inferior regulatory outcome for MNEs.71  However, in establishing the new 
institutions of the (micro-prudential) Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and the (macro-prudential) Financial Policy 
Committee (FPC) the UK has adopted the global financial reforms proposed at the 
international level by the G20, and implemented them into the UK’s regulatory 
architecture via EU Directives, the ESAs and the ESRB, which contributes towards 
hardening soft laws and establishing greater consistency in regulatory controls for 
MNEs.  The FPC has a clear remit to focus on the big picture and address the risk that 
areas of regulated activities may fall between the PRC and FCA, although it is too 
                                                 
67 Financial Services Authority, ‘Financial Services Authority: an outline,’ London (1997) p 2 
68 Gaps in policy and supervision. 
69 Financial Services Authority, ‘The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking 
Crisis,’ London (March 2009) para. 2.6  
70 Ferran, Eilis, ‘The break-up of the Financial Services Authority,’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
(2011) p 458 
71 Ibid. p 479 
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early to see whether they are effective.72  In addition, there are concerns that the 
BoE’s greatly increased responsibilities will be too much for the corporate 
governance they themselves have in place.73  
 
1.11 Conclusion 
Greater activity of international SSBs is already having an impact on the 
establishment of effective regulatory controls in the EU, and the Basel III rules on 
capital and liquidity may result in an era of improved financial stability, reducing the 
severity of pro-cyclical market movements and improving stability for MNEs.  The 
shift in regulatory focus that is taking place from micro-prudential to macro-
prudential regulation (which goes way beyond controlling the level of bankers’ 
bonuses)74 has the aim of countering the effect of pro-cyclicality in free market 
movements, where interplay between confidence and contagion75 fuels booms and 
exacerbates busts.76  Countries are enacting new laws to include for the first time 
macro-prudential matters,77 to better protect and enhance the stability of the financial 
system,78 and to improve protection to depositors and investors,79 in an attempt to 
control systemic risk in MNEs and control excessive financial risk-taking in the 
globalised financial markets.80 As financial stability is an essential pre-condition of 
sustainable economic growth,81 one might hope that the measures being taken are 
                                                 
72 Turner, op. cit. at 53 
73 Financial Times: London (23 May 2011) p 1 
74 Huertas, Thomas, Director Banking Sector, FSA Alternate Chair, European Banking Authority, 
‘Bankers’ bonuses: what regulation can and can’t do,’ London: Speech to The Policy Exchange (2011) 
75 Turner, op. cit. at 53, p 4  
76 HM Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulations: building a stronger system,’ London: The 
Stationery Office Ltd. (2011) p 18 
77 Financial Services Act 2010, c. 28, Section 1 
78 Financial Services Authority, ‘Implementing aspects of the Financial Services Act 2010,’ London 
(2010) 
79 Banking Act 2009 c. 1 
80 Alexander, op. cit. at 36  
81 HM Treasury, op. cit. at 76, p 19 
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radical enough82 to minimise the social impact of any future financial crisis, and offer 
MNEs the opportunity to develop their businesses in a more effectively controlled 
financial services regulatory environment. 
 
                                                 
82 Turner, Lord Adair, ‘Reforming finance: are we being radical enough?’ Cambridge: Clare 
Distinguished Lecture in Economics and Public Policy (2011) 
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Chapter 2  
Corporate Governance and Risk Management in Multi-national Enterprises 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the link between corporate governance and risk management in 
MNEs, giving examples where the “tone from the top”83 affects the risk profile of the 
company, its investment and services.  It also explores corporate governance and risk 
management as essential elements in sustainability of MNEs and the financial systems 
in which they operate, the distorting effect of high executive compensation packages, 
and how regulatory failings help to perpetuate illegal activity in MNEs. 
 
2.2 Failure of Risk Management in MNEs 
It is well documented that before and during the financial crisis, management and 
boards at MNEs failed to govern their organisations in a responsible manner.  This 
includes the choice of strategy and the assessment of risks to which the MNE would be 
exposed.  In 2012 the G30 noted: 
“…the history of financial crises, including the 2008-2009 crisis, is littered 
with firms that collapsed or were taken to the brink by a failure of risk 
governance.”84 
 
For example, in the UK alone, the failure of risk management leading up to and during 
the financial crisis led to negative externality costs of rescuing banks such as Royal 
Bank of Scotland and Northern Rock,85 funded by the UK taxpayer, and the ensuing 
government-initiated Walker Review identified that:  
                                                 
83 “Tone from the top” here refers to the perception of corporate stance on adherence to laws and 
regulations given from the board of directors to the workforce in an MNE  
84 Working Group on Corporate Governance, Group of Thirty, ‘Toward Effective Governance of 
Financial Institutions,’ Washington (2012) p 14 
85 Grice, Andrew, ‘£850bn: official cost of the bank bailout,’ London: The Independent (4 December 
2009) 
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“…serious deficiencies in prudential oversight and financial 
regulation…accompanied by major governance failures… contributed 
materially to excessive risk taking in the lead up to the financial crisis.”86  
 
2.3 Maximising Earning Potential 
Incentivising directors to achieve short term goals has become a concern of public law 
because of these negative externalities87  to society, which extend further than those to 
individual investors.88  As a result, board remuneration has come under scrutiny.   In 
2005, the Association of British Insurers’ guidance recommended that:  
“…annual bonuses, payable in cash, can provide a useful means of short 
term incentivisation.”89  
 
However, following the financial crisis, a report of the Commission of Experts of the 
President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International 
Monetary and Financial System, noted that: 
“…while markets are at the center of every successful economy, markets 
only work well when private rewards are aligned with social returns. 
Incentives matter, but when incentives are distorted, we get distorted 
behavior.”90 
 
Action has been taken at European level to address this, and the Capital Requirements 
Directive91 contains remuneration rules which EU Member States must enact into local 
country law.  Accordingly, in 2011 the FSA introduced their Remuneration Code,92 
recommending that bonuses are paid in instalments to high earners, encouraging 
sustainability by lowering the propensity of directors to maximise short term 
                                                 
86 Walker, Sir David, ‘A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry 
entities,’ London: HM Treasury (2009) p 9 
87 “Negative externalities” occur in finance where the cost of risks that financial services firms take are 
passed on to society, and not incurred by the firms themselves. 
88 Alexander, op. cit. at 36, p 490 
89Association of British Insurers, ‘Principles and Guidelines on Remuneration,’ London (2005) p 5 
90 Stiglitz, Joseph E., The Commission of Experts of the President of the UN General Assembly on 
Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System: Principles for a New Financial 
Architecture, New York (2009) Section 1.2 
91 EU Capital Requirements Directive 2010/76/EU (CRD3) 
92 Financial Services Authority, ‘Revising the Remuneration Code,’ London (2010) 
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opportunities.  It has been identified that unintended consequences of greater disclosure 
in executive pay may occur with the new proposals, though, including negatively 
affecting those jurisdictions which implement them most rigorously.93 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance and its Theories 
The term “corporate governance” has been defined in several ways, with the now 
classic definition provided by the Cadbury Report in 1992:  
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled…”94  
  
It is concerned with a series of relationships between a company’s management, board 
of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders, providing the structure through which 
the objectives of the company are set, and it provides the framework for monitoring 
performance against those objectives.  Currently, the interests and development of 
employees do not form part of the corporate governance paradigm, and arguably their 
inclusion would be helpful in implementing corporate governance.  The UK Combined 
Code 2010 states,  
“The board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership95 of the 
company within a framework of prudent and effective controls which 
enables risk to be assessed and managed”.96  
 
The board also has to see shareholders’ orders implemented through management and 
employees, and maintain external relationships with regulators and auditors.   
 
                                                 
93 Turner, Katharine, and Andrew Marshall, Corporate governance and remuneration in the financial 
services sector, London: Written evidence submitted to the Treasury Select Committee by Towers 
Watson (June 2012) section 3.15 
94 Cadbury, Sir Adrian, The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: A Report of the Committee 
on Corporate Governance, London: Gee & Co (1992) 
95 Lippitt, G L, ‘Entrepreneurial leadership: A performing art’ 21 The Journal of Creative 
Behaviour (1987) p 264  (Entrepreneurial leadership qualities include the ability to take risks, innovate, 
focus, take responsibility and have economic orientation) 
96 Financial Reporting Council ‘The UK Corporate Governance Code,’ London (2010) p 9 
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In his book entitled “The Wealth of Nations” (1776) Adam Smith articulated the risks 
of directors caring more for their own ends than shareholder value, in that the directors 
of companies, acting as managers of other people’s money, will not be as prudent with 
it as they are with their own.97 The argument is that the directors want to maximise 
benefit to themselves, in an arrangement where directors are agents and shareholders 
are principals, and it is noted that in the lead up to the financial crisis: 
“…executive compensation contributed to excessive risk-taking at banks 
and other financial firms, while institutional shareholders failed to exercise 
an effective stewardship role to curb the excessive risk taking of senior 
management at leading financial institutions.”98 
 
A major risk to the company in this theory comes from the directors themselves, which 
elevates the importance of director accountability99 and transparency as risk minimisers 
in MNEs, to avoid further decisions and actions being taken that lead, “…to terrible 
outcomes for employees, shareholders and the wider economy.”100   
 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory takes the view that directors are good 
guardians of the investments of shareholders, and the UK Stewardship Code 2010:  
“…aims to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional 
investors and companies to help improve long-term returns to shareholders 
and the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities.”101  
 
Good stewardship by way of internal control and risk management is recommended in 
the Turnbull Report to the Financial Risk Council:  
“A company's system of internal control has a key role in the management 
of risks that are significant to the fulfilment of its business objectives. A 
                                                 
97 Smith, Adam, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Electronic Classics Series (2005) (first published 1776) 
98 Alexander, op. cit. at 36, p 490 
99 Not only to shareholders, but to the general public in the current expectations of the community 
100 Working Group on Corporate Governance, Group of Thirty, op. cit. at 84, p 32 
101 Financial Reporting Council, ‘The UK Stewardship Code,’ London (2010) p 1 
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sound system of internal control contributes to safeguarding the 
shareholders' investment and the company's assets.”102 
 
 
2.5 Risk Management 
It is important to note that there are four categories of risk: foreseen, unforeseen, 
foreseeable and unforeseeable, and that not all risks are controllable.  Exercising good 
stewardship, a responsible and informed board will foresee all the foreseeable risks, and 
discover as many unforeseen risks as possible during their monitoring of operations, 
tracking of management information and engaging with all stakeholders, reducing 
unforeseen and even some unforeseeable risks by their knowledge, skills and 
diligence.103 
 
However well corporate governance is embedded in a banking MNE, and despite 
legislation, governments themselves may contribute towards systemic risk and 
introduce moral hazard, an unintended consequence of which is to incentivise some 
directors into excessive risk taking.  Where a bank’s failure might precipitate a 
financial crisis, its directors well know their accountability is limited as the country’s 
central bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will take ex post action to 
protect it from collapse. 104   This protects the financial system and economy of the 
countries involved in the short term, but at the same time it encourages directors to take 
greater risks, and MNEs to under-price risk, thereby undermining systemic stability.105   
“The Financial Stability Forum observed in an April 2008 report (before 
Lehman Brothers collapsed) that the 2007 credit crunch was the result of 
                                                 
102Financial Reporting Council ‘Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined 
Code’ London (2005) p3 
103 Cadbury, op cit. at 94 (see also Companies Act 2006) 
104 Herring, Richard, ‘The Central Role of Resolution Policy in Dealing with SIFIs,’ Basel: Presentation 
by International Association of Deposit Insurers (2011) 
105 Alexander, et al, op. cit. at 18, p 31 
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massive failings in risk management in some of the largest and most 
sophisticated financial institutions.  ”106 
 
Bailing out global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) encouraged 
reckless behaviour in undervaluing risk,107 and raised the likelihood of further 
default,108 as well as totally undermining financial services control frameworks in 
MNEs.109  According to Sir David Walker: 
“Governance failures contributed materially to excessive risk taking in the 
lead up to the financial crisis.”110  
 
This exposed financial institutions to high risk strategies that caused negative 
externalities in the form of catastrophic losses to investors, and incurred a large social 
cost in the interest of maximising profit.111 As a response from the United States of 
America (US), the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010112 makes it legally 
impossible for the US government to again bail out failing banks on an individual basis. 
 
2.6 Risk of Fraudulent Malpractice 
Regulatory progress by SSBs seeks to minimise the risk of malpractice, but an example 
of repeat occurrence is the fraudulent investment scheme structure pioneered by 
Charles Ponzi in the 1920’s, where returns were made to existing investors from funds 
contributed by new investors in the US.113 Although measures were taken to stop Ponzi 
schemes, during the 1990’s in the UK principles based regulatory framework, Equitable 
Life:  
                                                 
106 Alexander, op. cit. at 36, p 490 
107 Financial Stability Board, op. cit. at 44  
108 Rajan, Raghuram, Too Big to Save?  Bailouts hurt capitalism.  How we can keep from needing them 
in the first place, New York: Time Business (19 January 2012) 
109 Alexander, et al, op. cit. at 18, p 31 
110 Walker, op. cit. at 86 
111 Grice, op. cit. at 85 
112 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Pub.L.111-203 
113 280F.193;1922 US (Ponzi) 
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“…embarked on an aggressive marketing campaign, drawing in funds 
from hundreds of thousands of new policyholders in order to pay out 
bonuses far in excess of earnings to members departing the fund. A Ponzi 
scheme in all but name.” 114  
 
Also, more recently, it was found that Bernard Madoff was running, “The biggest dollar 
Ponzi scheme of all time.” 115 Assisted by globalisation, it affected investors in multiple 
jurisdictions whilst operating in the US rules based regulatory framework.  These 
examples show that even with jurisdictional regulatory advances, whether rules or 
principles based, given insufficient rigour in applying regulatory constraint, directors 
may abandon risk minimisation in favour of profit maximisation. 
 
2.7 Regulatory Supervision of MNEs 
The effect of weak regulatory response to MNE activity in evading financial services 
regulatory controls compounds inconsistent governmental actions, and in the UK, the 
FSA received considerable criticism for weaknesses in oversight that contributed to 
the financial crisis, sparking their reform of enforcement to the “credible 
deterrence”116 approach of more intrusive supervision.  Weak regulation has again 
been highlighted in the choice of strategy and assessment of money laundering risk 
adopted by HSBC as revealed to the US Senate Subcommittee for Investigations.117  
Rather than applying a standard that satisfied the soft law international codes of the 
SSBs, HSBC’s London based head office operated its subsidiary network by 
exploiting the advantages of regulatory arbitrage.  HSBC’s de-centralised, entity 
                                                 
114 Beale, M. et al ICA Diploma in Compliance: Course Manual,  Birmingham (England): International 
Compliance Training Ltd (2009) p 6 
115 Lex Team, ‘Madoff with ya money,’ London: Financial Times (12 December 2008) (also see: 
Madoff. 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 2009) 
116 Cole, Margaret, Director of Enforcement, Financial Services Authority, ‘Delivering Credible 
Deterrence, London: Speech at Annual Financial Crime Conference (April 2009) 
117 Levin, Carl, Opening statement, ‘U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs and Terrorist 
Financing: HSBC Case History,’ U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, (July 2012) 
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based corporate structure, together with indefensible risk analysis of anti-money 
laundering (AML) inaccurately minimised risk in its jurisdictions, products and 
services.  The HSBC in-house AML risk assessment placed Mexico, standing at 100 
out of 183 countries on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
2011, as “low risk” for AML controls, at the same time as HSBC was allowing 
billions of US dollars of drugs money to be laundered from Mexico through its US 
outlets, “…playing fast and loose with U.S. banking rules.”118  Here both the MNE 
board and management required affiliates not to carry out their own due diligence on 
the potential risks of transactions, but to accept the “low risk” classification as applied 
by head office.  This active failure of HSBC to control the risk of being used as a 
vehicle through which to launder the proceeds of crime and actually to enable it, 
continued for a number of years.  During this time HSBC had the attention of 
regulators regarding its operations in the US and Mexico: in 2003 HSBC was in 
enforcement with the Federal Reserve and the New York State Banking Department 
to improve its AML arrangements.  Again in 2010, HSBC was in enforcement with 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and was served with a Cease 
and Desist order requiring a second revamp of its US AML programme.  In addition 
to this, it has been found that HSBC at the same time was circumventing requirements 
of the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. 119  This catalogue 
of HSBC senior management’s deliberate failure to comply with AML and counter 
terrorist financing requirements was in part enabled by the OCC’s failure of AML 
oversight of HSBC in the US (HBUS), when they issued weak supervisory letters,120  
tolerating:  
                                                 
118 Levin, op. cit. at 117, p 1 
119 Ibid., p 4 
120 Ibid., p 326-330 
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“…the mounting AML problems at HBUS for five years, without taking any 
formal or informal enforcement action.”121 
 
In this example, weakness on the part of the OCC allowed HSBC to manoeuvre 
around regulatory requirements and jeopardise their own achievement of risk 
mitigation.  Now, HSBC has noted the importance of acknowledging international 
best practice to imply credibility by saying it will: 
“…adopt and enforce adherence to a single standard globally that is 
determined by the highest standard we must apply anywhere.”122 
 
Perhaps this MNE would have benefited from better oversight and stronger regulatory 
sanction at an early stage, as its senior management may then have followed agency 
theory and illegal activity with less vigour, changed the tone from the top, and attended 
more to establishing effective financial services regulatory controls as guardians in a 
stewardship role. 
 
2.8 Soft Law into Hard Law 
A telling trend that marks a shift from the voluntary guidance of stewardship theory to 
the controls of agency theory is that the principles of corporate governance are 
increasingly enacted into local country law and regulation, following international 
OECD and IOSCO123 guidelines.  The essential legal duties of directors under the 
Companies Act 2006 are a duty of trust, where directors are required to exercise care to 
protect the financial interests of shareholders, and a duty of care towards stakeholders, 
including employees, but not customers.  The MNE trying to establish financial 
services regulatory controls into its UK operations will find that the directors’ duty of 
maximising shareholder value is already at odds with the FSA’s principle of treating 
                                                 
121 Levin, op. cit. at 117, p 6 
122 Levey, Stuart, (Chief Legal Officer, HSBC Holdings plc) ‘Written Testimony for Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations,’ (July 17, 2012) p 7 
123 International Organisation of Securities Commissions, op. cit. at 37 
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their customers fairly,124 given by Section 5 of FSMA.  This is an example of greater 
legislation and regulation being enacted in a move away from the “comply or explain” 
culture of voluntary codes of conduct, at the same time causing conflicting overlap 
between SSBs.  These controls are made with the benefit of different stakeholder 
groups at heart, and the conflicting results increase the risk of non-compliance for an 
MNE when faced with multiple regulatory requirements amongst the jurisdictions in 
which they do business. 
 
Country based voluntary codes of conduct, such as that of the UK Institute of 
Directors,125 are still important in the development of corporate governance, as where 
there is a comply or explain expectation, code compliance can be instrumental in 
forming new laws.  Codes also give MNEs the opportunity to adhere to corporate 
governance standards, without forcing them to submit to costly laws.  Sanctions 
imposed by institutions such as the UK Listing Authority are serious, as they can inflict 
reputational damage, and ultimately can mean exclusion from continuing operations in 
their country and industry.  However, compliance to codes may be hampered by lack of 
willingness to adhere to best practice in MNEs, damaging implementation of good 
corporate governance, as in the case of HSBC, above.    
 
2.9 Impact of Share Ownership 
A potential risk minimising element that may help MNEs in achieving effective 
financial services regulatory controls, which is not included in current corporate 
governance guidelines is that of preventing directors from also being shareholders.  
                                                 
124 FSA Principle for Business 6, London: FSA Handbook, Release 127 (July 2012) 
125Institute of Directors Chartered Director Committee, ‘Chartered Director Code of Professional 
Conduct,’ London: Institute of Directors (February 2012) 
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This could remove the conflict of interests that director/shareholders have when on 
one hand they are responsible for profit maximisation and on the other embedding the 
principles of sound corporate governance, and put them more in the stewardship 
position of disinterested parties.  Where directors have too great an interest in the firm 
by being shareholders also, there is the potential that their responsibilities for 
embedding good governance and minimising the risks to the company will be 
overshadowed by their self-interest in profit maximisation by way of bonuses as well 
as shares and dividends, to the extent of taking increased risks to maximise profits for 
themselves.  However, the lack of personal interest that may result from neutrality 
should directors be prohibited from being shareholders may dilute both their interest 
and diligence in embedding effective regulatory controls.  In this way, the very 
mechanism created to enable them to exercise disinterested diligence removes their 
impetus to do so, reducing the incentive for them to be good stewards unless their 
remuneration is increased substantially to engage them. 
  
The logic that says personal interest leads to greater involvement and diligence is that 
in which employee share purchase schemes is encouraged.  Employee loyalty, 
personal buy-in and diligence at work are improved by having personal interest in the 
profitability of the company.  Employees then bring their knowledge and experience 
of business risks into the boardroom as enlightened shareholders, with first-hand 
knowledge of where effective controls may be lacking.  This democratic approach 
towards employee participation leads to stability and loyalty, which are both 
important pillars of corporate governance and risk minimisation in MNEs.  An 
organisation in which employees have an interest as principal in the firm, although not 
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an MNE, is the UK based John Lewis Partnership.  Since the 1920’s, the beneficial 
owners of John Lewis have been the employees whose shares are held in trust.126  
 
The occurrence of share ownership over the last 50 years, fuelled by technological 
advances notably in the clearing system, has given rise to 2 large groups of 
shareholders: institutional investors and private investors.  Institutional investors, 
holding large tranches of the shares of listed companies, can make real demands as 
principals and affect the course of the MNE’s progress.  They can influence the board 
of directors, their agents, to carry out their demands by removing their investment to 
another vehicle and adversely affecting the share price.  Institutional shareholders 
seek stability as well as profitability, and pressure from them might be sufficient to 
influence the directors to improve financial services regulatory controls, improving 
also stability and long term growth.  However, the large amount of share ownership 
by small investors, for example those investing in funds of funds127 without a depth of 
knowledge of the market or industry, does not fully support the Financial Reporting 
Council’s code of conduct guideline that boards of directors carry out orders from 
shareholders,128 as there is little likelihood that these shareholders will know enough 
about the business to minimise its risks and implement effective financial services 
regulatory controls.129 
  
The stakeholder group that has the greatest opportunity to benefit the organisation by 
its enlightenment is the board of directors.  A democratically run responsible and 
                                                 
126 John Lewis Partnership, ‘The Constitution of the John Lewis Partnership, Introduction, Principles 
and Rules,’ London (April 2012) p 5 
127 A fund of funds invests in other mutual funds, and does not invest selectively in any single holding. 
128 Financial Reporting Council ‘The Combined Code on Corporate Governance’ London (2003) 
129 UN Global Compact and the International Finance Corporation ‘Corporate Governance: The 
Foundation for Corporate Citizenship and Sustainable Businesses’ (2009) 
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informed board, having relevant diverse knowledge and skills to set the strategic aims 
and risk appetite of the organisation, without exposing it (and the economies in which 
it operates) to unacceptable levels of risk will, with appropriate culture, remuneration 
structure, soft law, as well as local legislation and independent judicial arrangements, 
be helpful in implementing effective regulatory controls.  Their diligent attendance to 
relevant management information can greatly reduce operational risks.  This is 
encouraged in UK financial services by the FSA’s Treating Customers Fairly 
initiative, a lynchpin of which is the management information review by relevant 
Approved Persons, including directors.130 
 
The UK’s FSA puts the onus of accountability onto Significant Influence Function 
Holders, senior managers who hold decision making responsibility.  Principle for 
Business 2 is fully in balance with the Companies Act 2006, when it states, “A firm 
must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence.”131 Further to this, 
Principle 3 requires a regulated firm, “to organise and control its affairs responsibly and 
effectively, with adequate risk management systems.”132 The appreciation of “risk” as 
referred to by regulators, is in connection with the risk that the firm in question poses to 
its ability to achieve its own objectives, which, for the FSA, currently are:  
“…maintaining confidence in the UK financial system,…contributing to the 
protection and enhancement of stability of the UK financial system, 
…securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers, and… 
reducing the extent to which it is possible for a regulated business to be used 
for a purpose connected with financial crime.”133 
 
                                                 
130 Financial Services Authority, ‘Treating Customers Fairly – guide to management information,’ 
London (July 2007) 
131 Financial Services Authority, ‘Principles for Business, Principle  2,’ London: FSA Handbook, 
Release 127 (July 2012) 
132 Financial Services Authority, ‘Principles for Business, Principle  3,’ London: FSA Handbook, 
Release 127 (July 2012) 
133 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 c. 8, section 2 
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As a result of international regulatory debate following the financial crisis, the FSA 
took on a statutory objective under the Financial Services Act 2010, to “contribute to 
UK financial stability.”134    This is noteworthy, as much criticism was levelled at FSA 
for not achieving this objective leading up to the financial crisis, when it did not at that 
time have the financial stability statutory objective in place.   
 
2.10 Transparency 
For the integration of effective multi-national financial services regulation to occur 
within an MNE, there must first be transparency and the willingness of directors to 
abide by the international codes.  Ideally, the offices of Chairman and Chief Executive 
are held by different people on a unitary board, and their executive management team, 
which is responsible for the day to day running of the company, is separate from the 
board of directors, whose main function is to minimise risks by maximising the 
opportunity to foresee risk.  Their horizontal power structure at board level enables full 
utilisation of the various skills and knowledge of each individual director, and brings 
greater breadth of understanding of a broad range of risks, thus minimising the risks 
inherent in the company’s operations.   Effective corporate governance depends largely 
on the tone from the top.  The input of effective non-executive directors is also very 
important in embedding corporate governance and risk minimisation,135  as they bring 
to the board political neutrality and independent judgement in managing risks.  
 
The responsibility of management in minimising risks is one primarily of control 
implementation, monitoring and remediation, and whereas management of the 
company’s operations by its employees is vertical in structure, the ideal horizontal 
                                                 
134 Financial Services Authority, op. cit. at 49, p 3 
135 Cadbury, op. cit. at 94 
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board structure gives each director, equally and severally, responsibility and similar 
duties, deriving their power from company law.   The link from the board to the 
executive management team is then hierarchical, creating a master/servant 
relationship, where the board that takes instructions from the shareholders, delegating 
activities to the management.  It could be argued that by using Germany’s two-tier 
board structure in large and public companies better transparency and effective 
participation of employees is achieved by bringing them closer to the board and their 
decisions,136 better enabling MNEs to establish effective regulatory controls. 
 
In a company with a hierarchical power structure at board level, such as Hyundai, the 
corporate structure is family-centric and paternalistic, with unfettered decision making 
power being held by the dominant entrepreneur, as seen in the South Korean 
“chaebol”137 structure. This is quite the opposite of the recommendation of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code,138 which requires firms along the lines of stewardship 
theory to separate out roles by the relevant ability, knowledge and skills and so share 
the responsibility for strategic decision amongst a diverse group bringing many 
informed views and experience, decreasing the risk of decision-making.  Although in 
the chaebol structure the board of directors may be well informed, they may not be 
able to effectively exercise their responsibilities under the control of the dominant 
entrepreneur.    
 
Where a MNE carries out a thorough risk analysis prior to making an investment 
overseas, including the business and country culture, it will capture local foreseeable 
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risks and largely enable their control by the board of directors.  An indicator of whether 
it will be possible to implement effective corporate governance is whether transparency 
is present in the host country’s business culture.  The information required for due 
diligence may not exist, and if it does, a lack of transparency may prevent the MNE 
from gaining access to it, wholly or in part, to an extent where it is not possible to 
assess the risks of investment, and due diligence will be incomplete.  The country’s 
culture will also affect the participation of the board of directors, institutional and 
private shareholders, employees and their ability to embed good corporate governance, 
depending on the level of development in the jurisdiction, and the levels of democracy, 
accountability, fairness and transparency in the MNE.  In the case of HSBC in Mexico, 
its decentralised governance model ideally positioned the businesses to “lean upon their 
US cousins,”139 pressurising them to accept transactions that were clearly outside of 
regulatory boundaries. 
 
Even if a MNE board of directors studies the IMF country profiles140 and carries out 
thorough due diligence before investing in a new jurisdiction, where there is little 
transparency information asymmetry occurs to the detriment of the MNE investor with 
the effect that the whole spectrum of risks will not be visible, and some real risks such 
as environmental risk, legislative and regulatory risk, and judicial risk may remain.  
The linked principles of transparency and democracy are very important in minimising 
risk, as where there is no transparency there is a lack of information, increasing the 
amount of unforeseeable and therefore uncontrolled risks.  Where public awareness is 
introduced, greater knowledge exists in the community and there is an increased 
potential for transparency to develop into a sustainable economic democracy.  
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For an MNE investing in a developing country, identification by a responsible and 
informed board of the areas in greatest need of development, such as education, public 
welfare, economic development and the wellbeing of the local environment, can help to 
reduce its investment risks.  If the board of directors does not include these in its risk 
assessment and mitigation, it is courting the resentment of local people and increasing 
the level of risk to which the MNE is exposed.  On the other hand, MNEs should also 
carry out their business in a transparent fashion, as they themselves are not transparent 
enough.  For instance, in removing the references to deposits made by investors in 
Iran,141 HSBC circumvented international requirements for several years, and only 
agreed to cease this activity upon regulatory action, incurring large fines.142 
 
2.11 Harmonisation and Best Practice 
The OECD has set out its guidelines to encourage MNEs to implement best practice 
policies which support sustainable development and promote social, economic and 
environmental objectives.143  In developing countries MNEs can follow codes of 
corporate governance conduct and implement effective financial services regulatory 
controls by following the international soft law guidelines adapted to the local 
environment,144 which can help to develop greater accountability and transparency, and 
even develop the judiciary where cases are brought in that jurisdiction.145   
 
Although international soft law conventions are not binding, they offer MNEs a best 
practice position from which to satisfy OECD guidelines, and in those countries 
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where these have been embedded even into the guidelines for legal action, such as the 
US sentencing guidelines,146 they offer protection against prosecution.  This has 
clearly been seen in the case of Morgan Stanley,147 where a former managing director, 
Garth Peterson, breached the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.148  Morgan Stanley were 
protected by having evidence of good governance controls in place, constituting a 
robust compliance programme, which acted as an effective defence,  
“Recognizing that a compliance program is not available as a formal 
affirmative defense, it is clear that Morgan Stanley was able to use not 
only their written compliance program but its ongoing maintenance, 
communication and due diligence aspects to shield the employer from 
liability.”149 
 
All MNEs are bound by the principles of international law.  If they are contracting in a 
foreign jurisdiction they work under the principles of international law, which are very 
clear, and include a preamble to explain the contract, its purpose and the obligations of 
the MNE.  This clarifies to both parties the extent and limits of expectations, which can 
be very important when an MNE is contracting with a government body.  State 
contracts carry more risks than ordinary commercial contracts as governments can 
change legislation and nationalise assets, as happened to Inchteck Tyres Ltd in 1984.150 
However, as this is the last occurrence of such a nationalisation, it does not pose a real 
risk to 21st Century MNEs. 
 
There has to be buy-in with integrity to soft international law for it to provide effective 
controls, and it is via the MNEs that the corporate governance initiatives of 
                                                 
146 United States Sentencing Commission, ‘2011 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual,’ Washington: 
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs (2011) 
147 U.S. v Peterson. 12-cr-00224 
148 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (FCPA) 
149 Fox, Thomas, ‘Morgan Stanley Gets Thumbs Up From DOJ & SEC For Best Practices Compliance 
Program,’ Dallas: Corporate Compliance Insights (May 2012) 
150 The Tyre Corporation of India Limited (Disinvestment of Ownership) Act, 2007 
F1005 
41 
organisations such as the OECD and IMF among others spread the reach of their codes 
into the practices of developing nations.  They aim to protect the interests of the local 
community and environment whilst still allowing the MNE to fulfil its primary purpose 
of maximising profits for its shareholders.  Although, where corporate governance has 
given way to profit maximisation, the local criminal community may also be benefitted 
by the MNE’s activities, as in the case of HSBC, above.    
 
Control of risk is essential to sustainability, and within an MNE the concept of risk 
minimisation when linked to investor returns may show that a low risk profile equates 
to low returns, but the risk minimisation associated with corporate governance is linked 
with the thorough identification and analysis of risks to the organisation, to minimise 
risks whilst maximising corporate sustainability.  These include cultural influence both 
internally and externally to the MNE, as well as financial risks.151   Although systemic 
risk, and how it manifests itself on the global financial system, has not yet been 
defined,152 writing in 2001, Joseph Norton identified four areas of potential systemic 
risk that were already present in the international financial system, which, he suggested, 
could only be addressed appropriately by MNEs and international SSBs working 
together.153  These are the risk of recurrence of a sovereign debt crisis, foreign 
exchange payment and settlement risk, money laundering and corruption risk, and cross 
border financial contagion risk.154 
 
2.12 Conclusion 
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The findings in this chapter demonstrate that both individual and systemic risks, if left 
unchecked, can cause serious financial damage to the stability of the financial 
marketplace as well as the long term survival potential of MNEs, emphasising the value 
of embracing the guidelines of international SSBs into their risk management 
framework.  The management of risks at both local and international level is a key 
factor in financial services regulatory controls, as MNEs with robust corporate 
governance arrangements will remain more stable in a downturn, helping to maintain 
the confidence of investors.    Market confidence has increasingly become a critical 
factor in the stability of global financial markets, as multi-national linkages create a 
network effect, and networks require confidence and stability155 to operate, benefitting 
from the consistency of the international regulatory approach.  This global theme is the 
subject of the next chapter, but it is relevant here as the failure of risk management 
controls embedded in an MNE have the potential to not only cause the failure of that 
group of companies, but also to severely impact the operation of the financial services 
global network. 
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Chapter 3  
Globalisation and the Focus of Regulation  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses how developments in communication technology, in particular 
the internet, have transformed the way that financial services in securities and banking 
operate, giving MNEs greater opportunities in reaching potential customers without 
having a clear, effective, regulatory environment in which to operate. 
 
3.2  Re-defining Identity 
MNEs can develop their business by having their head office in one (usually 
developed) jurisdiction and creating or acquiring subsidiaries to give a “family tree” 
of entities across the globe.  The transfer of intellectual capital from the MNE to 
subsidiaries in developing countries helps to build their international capability and 
brings them into the realm of international conventions which transcend the local 
political and economic power base.  As MNEs buy up local entities and change their 
names to that of the corporate identity, even where the same individuals are employed 
in the entity the local perception of it and its power relations become more 
international, and the simple way for an MNE to implement coherent financial 
services regulatory controls is to adopt international soft law conventions that broadly 
cover local requirements.  Indeed, it has been claimed in offering an explanation as to 
why countries tend to adhere to international soft law, 
“The modern transformation of sovereignty has remade international law, 
so that international law norms now help construct national identities and 
interests through a process of justificatory discourse.”156 
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Although this may overstate the effects of globalisation, the introduction of 
international enterprise blurs the bright lines of jurisdictional control, and coherence 
in regulatory terms includes addressing risks of the detailed “nuts and bolts” locally, 
as well as those risks that manifest themselves in the larger financial system.157  
 
The virtuous circle arrangement of development linked to the establishment of 
effective financial services regulatory controls turns on itself, though, when the MNE 
is doing business in the developing jurisdiction to benefit from regulatory arbitrage, 
and lowers the threshold of the whole MNE to sub-standard practices.  HSBC found 
that their decentralized management model, focusing on country heads did not allow 
international policies and procedures to be adequately implemented, resulting in the 
action against them in the US for allowing drugs money from Mexico to be laundered 
easily through their business.158  HSBC found that while their old model served them 
well historically, before financial globalisation: 
“…it does not work in an interconnected world where transactions cross 
borders instantaneously and where weaknesses in one jurisdiction can be 
quickly exported to others.”159 
 
 
3.3 Regulatory Developments in Europe 
In the EU, even though regulatory treaties and directives attempt to normalise local 
country financial services regulation across Member States, regulation has not yet 
embraced globalisation sufficiently to move from being country-based,160 although the 
establishment of the ESRB and strengthening of European regulatory architecture has 
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partially addressed this.161  MNEs cannot choose to comply with the regulations of, say, 
the jurisdiction of their head office but have to comply with the laws and regulations of 
each host country in which they carry out their business, increasing many times the 
burden of regulatory compliance.  Differences in regulatory regimes do give rise to 
conflicts of laws and regulatory arbitrage, because: 
“…the international regulatory agenda has not paid sufficient attention to 
MNCs (Multi-National Corporations). Their regulation has remained 
largely confined to the domestic forums. The inability of domestic law to 
grapple with the concept of MNCs and the failure at international law to 
deal effectively with it have led to regulatory gaps.”162 
 
These gaps are symptomatic of the vacuum in financial services regulation at an 
international level163 that the FSB is now trying to address. 
 
3.4 The Internet: Accelerator of Globalisation  
Perhaps the most influential accelerator of globalisation in financial services is the 
internet. Globalisation is essentially an economic process, but one with political 
consequences, which opens up remote regions of the world to expand in trade, 
investment and economic opportunity. Technological developments in 
communications and transportation as instruments of globalisation have accelerated 
its pace, and as the speed and ease of communication increased, the liberalisation164 of 
financial markets and linkages amongst players became easier.  It is a relatively new 
concept that countries liaise with each other on such a speedy and constant basis.  
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Leading up to the financial crisis, regulation remained micro-prudential and enshrined 
in local administrative laws.  National regulators had not adapted to the demands and 
inter-connectivity of the market, having failed as yet to fully engage with the many 
substantive and jurisdictional issues arising from internet securities offerings and 
secondary trading.165  The network effect of the internet based international capital 
markets are relatively new for Europe based MNEs.  Bank loans were the method of 
capital raising before 1988, when currency exchange controls were removed across 
the EU allowing investors to operate across borders and in other currencies.  Bank 
loans do not pose the same vulnerability to contagion and pro-cyclical market 
movements as international capital markets.166   
 
3.5 Relevance of Jurisdictional Laws in International Regulation 
In the international capital markets sector of the financial services industry, securities 
regulation is, in effect, a private law specialised anti-fraud regime with criminal 
sanctions for failure to comply.  If securities regulation was removed, 90% of 
securities regulations would still apply through criminal law.  Its introduction to the 
legal framework aimed to remove caveat emptor167 risk from the investor in securities 
and place them into a controlled environment where investor confidence would be 
restored after the financial frauds of the 1920s.168 With securities regulation, the 
financial markets are segregated and individually studied, so local country securities 
regulation becomes better developed as the financial markets of a country develop.  
Without this, abuse of investors is almost inevitable, as corporate managers are 
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incentivised as agents169 to look after their own and shareholders’ interests, and not 
the public interest.  Using their industry expertise, regulatory technocrats specify and 
particularise generic laws, introducing standards and tools to control this risk, and 
these controls have, essentially, remained in place since the 1930s.   
 
In financial services MNEs their Information Technology (IT) network is a 
fundamental enabling factor of operating globally.  Capital movement has increased, 
with the technological advances of telecommunications and the internet170 removing 
barriers to international financial transactions.  These began to establish during the 
1990’s whilst the legal and regulatory regimes governing them remained country 
specific,171 blind to their attendant network effects, as SSBs and market participants 
themselves did not fully realize that: 
“…financial globalisation is bound up with a specialisation in financial 
services that makes countries much more vulnerable to each other’s 
mishaps.”172 
 
Rules of international law define that the state can apply its own laws within its 
country.  For example, it is easy if an MNE is selling US securities in the US: they 
have to apply US law.  However, a country can also apply its laws if conducts have 
effects upon its jurisdiction.  50 years ago it was almost impossible to have an impact 
on the jurisdiction of another country in a securities offering as there was no way of 
communicating it effectively across borders without deliberately approaching 
individual investors.  However, financial markets responded at every step of the 
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technological revolution, and in 1995 the first bank in the world offered transactional 
services over the internet.173   This was very innovative, and opened the door for 
people all over the world with an internet connection to view a securities offering, as 
issuers are not prevented from posting prospectuses online.  However, because of the 
way that securities regulation has developed offering investor protection to reduce the 
effect of information asymmetries, it is the responsibility of the financial services firm 
offering the product to control communications to the participants in the investment.  
The IOSCO report of 1998174 described several applications of the internet to the 
securities industry, and identified the impact of securities regulation and capital 
markets regulation the internet on Wall Street, where later securities issuers were 
offering trading, purchasing and selling investments. 
 
The ease of access to information from overseas on the internet his gives rise to 
legislative jurisdictional problems for MNEs that issue securities, which regulatory 
bodies have yet to address.  The Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and the 2004 Transparency Directive in Europe,175 none of these specify the 
territorial scope of application of the relevant rules, and this creates problems with the 
internet and legislative jurisdiction.  Over the decades, there has not been progress in 
this area, and the lack of clarity in legislative jurisdiction when operating via the 
internet continues.  Transactions in banking are well advanced and benefit from 
greater clarity, but listing securities by using the internet has made it impossible for 
MNEs to put in place effective financial services regulatory controls, creating 
problems in regulatory, as well as legislative and judicial terms.  This is because 
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securities regulators have applied the principle of technological neutrality to matters 
surrounding jurisdiction.  The principle of neutrality says that all communications 
media are the same, be it letters sent through the post in paper format, or by fax, or by 
the internet.  The issue is that the internet is not like other forms of communications in 
three distinct ways: firstly, in establishing regulatory jurisdiction, secondly in the 
application of legislative jurisdiction, and thirdly in establishing judicial jurisdiction.   
When a securities prospectus is put on to the internet by an issuer that is for 
professional investors only in, say, the US, it is immediately available by anyone with 
an internet connection across the globe.  The issuer may include some wording to the 
effect that it is an offering to professional investors in the US, but private investors 
overseas also can view the information, which cuts across accessibility of information 
on securities rules in Section 5 of the Securities Act 1933.  In addition to this, it is 
quite possible that other countries have rules to prevent information intended for high 
risk issues to professional investors to be made available to private investors.  To 
implement effective controls in this regard, the MNE would have to check every 
securities system in the world to see whether it is legal to market those securities 
there, which is clearly not a viable proposition.  This is a regulatory gap caused by the 
removal of barriers to free trade, the network effects of securities globalisation, and 
the paradigm shift in execution of securities trades brought about by technological 
advancement, in particular, the internet.  These areas require considerable research 
before regulatory progress can be made.  Perhaps some optimism can be drawn from 
the comments of Commissioner Daniel Gallagher of the Securities Exchange 
Commission, to Jack Katz’ incisive call for a special study of US regulatory policy, to 
include: 
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“…the future of the U.S. and global secondary market structure, the 
interaction of the equity, debt and derivatives markets nationally and 
internationally, and the development of a corporate disclosure system that 
reflects the needs of investors and the information technology of the present 
and future.”176 
 
There are securities already for which it is impossible to determine the country of 
issue and ownership, making a mockery of country financial services and AML 
regulation, so the move to a level playing field at international level is imperative.  
This may take decades to implement, and it gives imbalances of greater cost on 
smaller players, but should MNEs operating in developing countries wish to have 
access to international markets, increasingly they have to adopt and adhere to 
international standards of increased openness and transparency,177 accountability and 
responsibility to address asymmetries of information178 and avoid withdrawal of IMF 
funding, even though the IMF themselves operate in a, “…prevailing culture of 
secrecy.”179 They also have to comply with international conventions, and legislation 
with extra-territorial application such as the US PATRIOT Act 2001 and the UK 
Bribery Act 2010, and there is an argument for its regulatory framework to be 
international to avoid conflicts of laws issues when implementing extra-territorial 
laws to control risk. The consequences of increased globalisation and technological 
change include an increase in both risk universe and the speed of change, which 
necessitates forward looking and responsive action by international as well as local 
legislators and regulators to minimise the risks of profit maximisation by boards.  
Without this, hierarchical structures that prevent democracy, accountability and 
fairness cannot be overcome and transparency cannot be optimised to provide the 
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stepping stones towards effective minimisation of risk by way of the establishment of 
effective financial services regulatory controls in MNEs. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The globalisation of financial services offerings has outstripped by far the ability and 
knowledge of regulators to enact appropriate controls, and before the financial crisis it 
can be argued that local country regulators and international SSBs did not appreciate 
the full expanse of risk that existed in the internet-enabled global financial system and 
the impact that network effects have on it.  To re-establish effective regulatory controls 
in financial services MNEs, a modernisation of regulation taking into account 
technological change and the resulting challenges to sovereignty, differences in 
development of countries and the driving forces of myriad local and international SSBs 
could hardly be more necessary.
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Conclusions  
 
Having considered whether an effective participation of a responsible and informed 
board of directors, shareholders and employees might be helpful in implementing 
effective financial services regulatory controls in MNEs, it can be seen that a 
fundamental requirement is pre-existing appropriate and effective legal, regulatory and 
institutional foundations upon which to build.  Directors have the incentive of the 
financial system which protects them from failure and encourages them to take risks, 
but also the codes of conduct, legal and regulatory frameworks that aim to control the 
risks.   
 
The financial crisis demonstrated how local country and international SSBs failed to 
provide appropriate regulatory and supervisory standards, and there is no doubt that 
the financial crisis: 
“…triggered intense efforts internationally, regionally and nationally to 
enhance the monitoring of systemic stability and to strengthen the links 
between macro- and micro-prudential oversight.”180 
 
Exacerbated by the trend to use the capital markets rather than bank loans to raise 
capital, systemic risk was introduced into the financial system without identifying and 
recommending adequate controls, although risk elements were evident and discussion 
was taking place as to the likely outcome being a financial crisis as far back as 
2001.181 The network effect of inter-linkages in the financial system and the 
destructive effect as confidence decreased during the financial crisis moved the focus 
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of regulatory attention to strengthening fiscal controls and developing the tools of 
macro-prudential supervision.182  The President of the European Central Bank183 
expects these tools to be established at the earliest around 2015,184 and reforms 
demonstrate that the direction and pace of development are not set by the SSBs 
themselves but are essentially reactions to external influences including political, 
environmental, industry driven and economic factors and events, including advances 
in technology, the media, other regulators, governments and large firms and their 
shareholders.185   
 
Jurisdictional development of regulatory laws will remain diverse as long as 
sovereignty of states to regulate holds the dominant discourse, keeping sovereignty 
costs low to the governments of jurisdictions in which financial services MNEs 
operate. Compliance with hard local legislation favours a decentralised MNE 
structure, with each local entity being largely responsible for its own legal and 
regulatory compliance programme within the MNE.   By comparison, soft law 
arrangements favour a centralised approach, where a central policy can be 
implemented that is in compliance with international conventions, which is both cost 
effective and relatively simple to implement in that one coordinated and robust 
compliance programme can be put in place across all entities for the MNE.  However, 
they are effective only to the extent that individual governments and MNEs want 
them to be, being non-enforceable and relatively cheap to exit,186 although controls 
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via the World Bank and its financial awards can be, for relevant players, a very 
effective way of encouraging appropriate buy-in. 
 
In the debate on whether it is possible to establish global regulation of financial 
services, or whether it will always be fragmented by local country legislation and 
regulation, global technology is a key player as more and more banking services and 
capital markets products are web based and do not respect national boundaries.  
Although any international agreement on harmonizing financial services regulation 
may not be possible and may result in undesirable sacrifices of sovereignty,187 
international soft law does allow progress to occur in a practical, pragmatic and cost 
effective manner, at a faster pace that the enactment of hard law, which is more in 
keeping with the pace of change in the financial services market, crucially without 
incurring sovereignty costs.188  Even where international conventions have no binding 
power, they are increasingly important mechanisms for promoting the convergence 
and harmonisation of national financial law and regulation.189  
  
With all of the recent changes in financial architecture, the most notable is the move 
to looking outwards from the micro-prudential regulation of individual banks and 
other financial institutions, and towards macro-prudential issues including countering 
the pro-cyclical tendency of market influences, and increasing to a material extent the 
capital adequacy requirements of banks.  The unsurprising attention that banks are 
receiving from legislative and regulatory bodies around the world in the wake of the 
financial crisis may result in a more comprehensive and flexible era of financial 
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regulation.  However, systemic risk and its components have still not yet been fully 
defined and the G20 appear still to be focussing on enhancing the micro-prudential 
areas that they know already without actually committing to identifying in detail the 
gaps in international financial services regulation. 
 
The impact of international SSBs on establishing effective regulatory controls can be 
seen as a co-ordinating element, empowering local regulators to more confidently 
implement relevant regulations knowing that international conventions have been 
established to support them.  The advantage of reducing the possibility of using 
regulatory arbitrage by jurisdictions adopting international soft law conventions into 
local regulation offers the possibility of a more consistent and predictable market 
place, and potential for the better establishment of robust compliance programmes and 
effective financial services regulatory controls in MNEs.   
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